THE ROLE OF ON THE MOVE AND UPVALLEY FAMILY CENTERS IN THE LOCAL RESPONSE TO THE 2017 NAPA COUNTY WILDFIRES:

Lessons in Disaster Recovery
Introduction

On the evening of October 8, 2017, multiple wildfires broke out across Northern California, including several major blazes within and around Napa County. Due to extreme weather conditions the fires grew rapidly, burning hundreds of thousands of acres, causing billions of dollars in damage, forcing more than 90,000 residents to evacuate from their homes, and, most tragically, killing 44 people and hospitalizing at least 185 others. Despite the heroic efforts of more than 10,000 firefighters, it would be weeks before the fires were fully contained.

While firefighters from around the world battled the blazes, nonprofit community-based organizations, public agencies, philanthropic funders, and volunteers from throughout Napa County rallied to provide refuge and address the urgent and complex needs of impacted and displaced residents. Drawing on their established community connections as well as communication and coordination infrastructure and processes developed in the wake of the 2014 Napa earthquake, “second responder” organizations helped translate and disseminate critical public information for non-English speakers, set up operational centers to provide emergency financial assistance and support services, and facilitated the transition to long-term assistance for those most affected by the fires.

At the time, these were the deadliest fires in California history to date. Due to the scale of the devastation and the disaster’s location in a region famous for tourism, the wildfires received significant international media attention, especially during the first week. Tens of billions of dollars in donations from around the world poured in to various recovery funds. Over time, as the flames were quelled and the situation on the ground shifted from emergency response to longer-term recovery, public concern began to fade.

While much attention was rightly paid to the immediate devastation caused by the fires, there has been comparatively little sustained public interest in addressing the longer-term human and economic impacts and what it will take for the region’s residents—especially those with limited means—to fully recover. For Napa community members who were already experiencing poverty and marginalization, this disaster has proven to be particularly dire and urgent, and its effects longer-lasting. Much work remains to be done to support these residents in their recovery from the displacement, economic disruption, and trauma stemming from the fires.

This report explores some lesser-known effects of the fires while documenting the disaster response activities of On the Move (OTM) and UpValley Family Centers (UVFC) in Napa County, assesses the effectiveness and limitations of these efforts, and distills lessons that can be used to inform future disaster preparedness and planning locally and around the country.

About On the Move and UpValley Family Centers

On The Move (OTM) was founded in 2004 with a mission to develop and sustain young people as leaders by building exceptional programs that challenge inequities in their communities. For over 14 years, OTM has provided high-impact programming that works to close the achievement gap for children of color, help former foster youth transition to independence, widen acceptance for LGBTQ community members, and build strong, engaged families. Each year OTM serves approximately 10,000 children, youth, and adults in multiple California counties, working to transform the outcomes experienced by our most vulnerable residents. In all of its work, OTM participants are not only recipients of social services, they are active leaders in supporting their peers, guide and shape program delivery and advocate for participant voice to be heard and recognized in the broader community.

Founded in 1999, the UpValley Centers of Napa County (UVFC) provides guidance, support, and resources in the community, in the home, and for the individual, so that everyone can achieve a better life. UVFC envisions that through healthy relationships and networks of support, all people are safe, valued, and prepared to create the future they want for themselves, their families, and their community. UVFC’s guiding principles are: trust, dignity, respect and cultural sensitivity, equity and collaborative action. UVFC operates Family Resource Centers in Calistoga and St. Helena, including offices at local public schools. UVFC annually serves over 3,000 children, youth, adults, and seniors who live and/or work in the rural communities of Calistoga, St. Helena, Deer Park, Angwin, Pope Valley, Lake Berryessa, Oakville, and Rutherford.
The story of the Napa community’s response to the 2017 fires begins three years earlier, with the region’s last natural disaster: the 6.0 magnitude earthquake that hit the Napa area on August 24, 2014. The earthquake started several fires and caused hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to commercial and residential buildings and other infrastructure, including streets, sidewalks, and the water system. One person was killed, and at least 200 were injured.

Following the earthquake, through a generous donation from Napa Valley Vintners the Napa Valley Community Foundation (NVCF) established a Disaster Relief Fund to provide support to victims. Grants were initially distributed to a number of local organizations, including On the Move (OTM), to provide immediate services to more than 12,000 victims, including housing assistance and capital repairs, food and clothing, legal aid, medical care, and counseling. Cash assistance was also distributed to 1,400 of the most severely impacted residents.

The 2014 earthquake experience motivated Napa leaders to reexamine their disaster response processes and work with community-based organizations to be better prepared for future events. After the urgent needs of many local residents had been addressed, NVCF focused its resources on building the capacity of local nonprofits and community agencies to respond to future disasters both individually and collectively.

NVCF also convened a cohort of local organizations to develop a Community Organizations Active in Disaster (COAD), a formal structure for the planning, communication, and coordination of the local community’s response to emergency and disaster situations. Through the COAD, continuity of operations and emergency plans were developed, partnership agreements and communications models were formed, and coordination, referral and response systems were established. Finally, the foundation developed a process for issuing pre-approved grants to several local organizations with established community connections, including OTM and UpValley Family Centers (UVFC), to expedite their ability to activate and address community needs in the event of future disasters. This pre-planning was instrumental to organizations including UVFC when the Valley Fire broke out the following year. UVFC responded to that 2015 fire, and would later utilize that experience when responding to the 2017 fires.

Also following the 2014 earthquake, NVCF convened a cohort of local organizations, including OTM and UVFC, to develop concrete communication, coordination, and response processes through the COAD, and authorizing expedited financing to key organizations, NVCF significantly improved the community’s readiness for future disasters. This preparation would prove to be invaluable when the fires broke out in 2017.

A Catalyst for Preparedness: The 2014 Earthquake

LESSON

Form a Community Organizations Active in Disaster (COAD) to identify local lead organizations, establish emergency and continuity-of-operations plans, develop partnership agreements and information sharing, and communication and coordination processes.

“During the fire, I lost wages and my hours at work were cut after the fires, too. The assistance helped pay the rent and keep a roof over my children’s heads.”

LESSON

Build the capacity of local community-serving organizations to immediately step in and address unmet human needs during a disaster, including securing pre-approval of grants for emergency assistance and services to expedite their ability to respond, and requiring nonprofits to develop detailed plans for how they will quickly administer and distribute resources during a disaster.
Following the development of the COAD, OTM, UVFC, and other local organizations were far more prepared and equipped to respond to disasters. However, it quickly became apparent that the October 2017 fires would necessitate a very different kind of response than was deployed for the earthquake. While terrifying and highly destructive, the earthquake ended within seconds and most of its damage was centralized in the City of Napa. UVFC had responded to the Valley Fire in 2015, when Lake County residents were evacuated to the Calistoga Fairgrounds. While lessons were learned during that fire response—particularly about the importance of a coordinated local response—the 2017 fires required a larger scale response, raging as they did for weeks, and spreading all across the region.

Late on the evening of October 8, more than a dozen fires started nearly simultaneously across and around Napa County. The combination of winds of up to 60 miles per hour, low humidity, and dry vegetation enabled the fires to spread rapidly, forcing urgent evacuations and leveling entire neighborhoods. For several days high winds persisted and the fires raged uncontrollably, threatening communities throughout the county. Even a week after they started, most of the major fires were less than 50 percent contained, and it took more than three weeks before the fires were fully contained.

The speed at which the fires spread, massive devastation they wrought, and wild unpredictability of where they might turn next took an immense psychological toll on the local population. Residents felt terrified and helpless as the disaster unfolded. In this small and tight-knit community, nearly everyone had friends or family who suffered greatly. As time went on, the prolonged, and in many cases permanent, displacement of residents produced additional trauma and economic insecurity.

When the fires broke out, OTM and UVFC promptly deployed staff to local shelters to ensure that they functioned as safe places for children and families and to assist in the coordination of services for evacuees, including access to financial resources and social services and interpretation of public emergency information.

To coordinate the distribution of aid and the provision of direct services by the various activated local organizations, OTM and UVFC provided bilingual translation services and developed...
a data system that collected and consolidated intake information from people seeking assistance.

Efforts by public agencies to communicate with local residents about the fires, evacuation measures, and available resources during this time were plagued with problems. Various cities and agencies disseminated public information using different systems and platforms, leading to significant confusion and undermining confidence about the timeliness and accuracy of any particular piece of information. Emergency announcements were sent frequently, yet information about where to access support services simply did not regularly reach vulnerable and displaced residents.

Furthermore, emergency information was only being accurately sent to mobile phones in English due to translation issues, despite the fact that one-quarter of the county’s population are native Spanish speakers. Recognizing that this was jeopardizing access to vital safety information for many residents at a time of great uncertainty and peril, OTM reached out to county officials and local law enforcement and offered to help translate emergency information. OTM ultimately coordinated 24/7 translation services for these emergency alerts, with UVFC and other partners providing staffing for shifts. Each announcement was translated within minutes of its release and sent back to law enforcement for distribution in Spanish.

A week later, OTM began providing services out of the Local Assistance Center (LAC) in the City of Napa. The opening of the LAC established a centralized location to deliver assistance to impacted residents, and united a range of county, state, and federal government services as well as local non-profits, including OTM, Cope Family Center, Napa Emergency Women’s Services (NEWS), and UVFC.

Due to limited resources, a second LAC was not opened in Calistoga and the COAD proved a critical place to discuss the importance of bringing services to Calistoga, especially because the city had been evacuated. In a COAD meeting, it was agreed that the County and UVFC would co-host two joint resource fairs in Calistoga. As a result, most of the resources available at the LAC were made available to Calistoga residents in their local community, including FEMA, EDD, Napa County Mental Health, and PG&E.

Communication among responders proved difficult. Members of the COAD communicated effectively with one another utilizing the processes and protocols they had developed together following the earthquake, yet their coordination with county, state, and federal agencies remained difficult. These public agencies synchronized their roles and efforts through the incident command system (ICS), a preexisting structure for managing government functions and operations during a disaster that had been established by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CALFIRE). ICS and COAD agencies could have benefitted from more integrated communication structures to improve their coordination.

The coordinated response could also have been enhanced if representatives from cities and school districts had been at the COAD table. After the disaster, UVFC met with local officials and made connections to COAD. Some local officials expressed interest in utilizing—in the event of another disaster—the model of pre-authorized disaster grant agreements NVFC used.

LESSON
Smaller, rural communities may need to advocate for alternate means of receiving services if Local Assistance Centers are opened only in population centers within a county.

LESSON
Because the fires occurred in contiguous counties, some residents who live in one county and work in the other county found themselves straddling between two jurisdictions and unsure how and where to access services. County leaders should examine how to ensure County lines don’t create barriers to accessing resources.

LESSON
To effectively utilize the experience and skills possessed by external individuals and organizations supporting disaster response, COADs and public agencies engaging in disaster planning should develop best practices and protocols to integrate the roles of these outside experts into all phases of communication and coordination of the locally led response.

LESSON
Public agency and local nonprofit and community-based organization leaders must proactively collaborate in deliberate and comprehensive disaster pre-planning and develop an integrated and comprehensive and fully coordinated system of response.
The response and recovery were also hindered by difficulties in engaging and coordinating with outside individuals and organizations that arrived offering expertise in disaster recovery, including expert consultants and staff from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). There was no organized process for integrating outside experts into the local response and recovery process and thus their potentially invaluable experience and expertise went largely unutilized.

OTM and its partnering agencies met with more than 1,100 residents seeking help during the two-week period they were operating out of the LAC. (UVFC worked out of their Up Valley offices, providing relief and recovery services, and contacted any Up Valley residents who had visited the LAC.) The organizations provided outreach and public health education; offered internet and phone access; distributed gift cards; set up donation drop-off sites; and referred displaced residents to child care, temporary housing assistance, counseling, and legal services. The partners also distributed basic necessities including food, clothing, and health and hygiene products, both from community donations and purchased with the organization’s own resources.

During this stage of the response, the primary objective was to fill service gaps, avoid duplication, and coordinate resources to address the unmet needs of impacted residents. The partners found it helpful to work closely together to create continuity in their systems as well as sharing templates and other documents, thereby reducing the burden on individual agencies and staff. OTM and UVFC were uniquely positioned to play a leadership role due to their direct service experience, strong connections to the local community, and unique staff qualifications, including bilingual and bicultural competency. However, given the immensity of need, the demands of the response placed a significant capacity burden on the organizations.

Volunteer support from the community helped tremendously, and the organizations were able to expand their reach by coordinating 524 hours of assistance from dozens of volunteers. The partners also redistributed staff time to allocate all employees to the response effort and held daily staff meetings to coordinate the work of employees deployed across the county. All of the organizations’ existing clients were proactively contacted to establish their safety, determine their needs, and make them aware of available resources. Additionally, staff was able to meet the needs of residents utilizing the organization’s trauma-informed approach.

**RESIDENT PROFILE**

With jobs in landscaping and food service, Ada and Juan suffered immediate economic hardship when the fires broke out. Juan was laid off after the landscaping company he was employed by lost clients whose homes were damaged or destroyed. Business at the restaurant Ada worked at was sharply curtailed as the region scrambled to recover from the fires. Struggling to make ends meet, the family sought assistance at the LAC. They received rental assistance from COPE right after the fires to cover their next rent payment, and further rental support from the Napa Fire Recovery Center through the emergency financial assistance program. Ada was referred for individual therapy to help her manage the ongoing stress. The coordinated services the family received at the LAC helped the family recover from the financial and emotional blows imposed by the disaster, and they have since regained their employment and are healing from the trauma.
In order to meet the overwhelming and vast needs of impacted residents, OTM and UVFC staff uprooted their own lives and worked overtime to help.

Staff of some of the partner organizations were personally impacted by the fires. Furthermore, as is common in the aftermath of a disaster for employees of organizations active in response, some suffered from secondary trauma after serving so many neighbors and community members in distress.

To prevent this occurrence and ensure their own staff were being supported during this difficult period, OTM and UVFC provided employees with access to on-site mental health and counseling services and recuperative treatments, and led daily check-ins with all staff members. The organizations also established a disaster paid time off policy for staff who needed time for self-care. This helped OTM and UVFC sustain their operations throughout the recovery.

While operating out of the LAC, OTM worked to secure the resources and develop the intake processes to effectively and efficiently distribute emergency financial assistance to those in need. However, developing data collection and management systems on the fly and only after the outbreak of the fires proved to be extremely difficult and frustrating. As OTM and other organizations navigated each phase of the recovery, four separate data systems had to be developed to help residents access resources and services—each more comprehensive and evolved than the last. It would have been far more efficient to have a pre-developed database to centralize all of the information that would be needed from the beginning—including for those who would eventually transition to long-term assistance.

At the same time, OTM became aware of the limitations of working within the LAC to serve the community, including the presence of federal and military personnel. Undocumented community members in particular avoided the LAC altogether—despite assurances from the County that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents would not be present—due to concerns under the current political climate that their immigration status would be checked. Accordingly, OTM assessed other more community-friendly and safe spaces to identify a new site for its operations.

In early November, OTM transferred its emergency assistance operations and programs to two new hubs: the Family Resource Center at McPherson Elementary School and the Innovations Community Center. Additional sites

**LESSON**

Playing an active role in disaster response and recovery can take a significant toll on nonprofits, community-serving organizations, and their personnel. Organizations need to prepare staff for the demands of disaster response and recovery and the centrality to an organization’s mission, and should have support systems in place for staff to address their personal needs as well as for those suffering from burnout and/or secondary trauma.

**LESSON**

Develop data collection and management systems and intake processes to track and coordinate disaster services and avoid duplication, factoring in the possible transition from emergency assistance to long-term recovery.

**LESSON**

Public agencies should work with local community-based organizations to identify and design safe and welcoming emergency service sites accessible to the entire community for the distribution of resources and co-location of services during a disaster.
were established and operated by other local community-based organizations across Napa County.
UVFC opened additional offices at their Washington Street location in Calistoga, working with local newspapers, radio stations, and the City to conduct outreach.

Each of these organizations used the intake protocols and database developed by the partners and NVCF to collect the same basic information from residents they were serving, and the distribution lists were regularly cross-referenced in order to avoid duplication.

After the fires were extinguished, Napa County was primarily focused on logistical and operational concerns, with cleanup and infrastructure restoration being major priorities. The County was significantly impacted by these duties, limiting their ability to respond to the human needs arising from the fires. In fact, many Napa County human service staff were actually redeployed during this time to support other functions. This void, combined with attrition in the active participation of a number of community-based organizations, forced OTM and UVFC to take on a greater leadership role. Accordingly, OTM, UVFC and a few other non-profits assumed primary responsibility for meeting the county’s human needs, especially for low-income and immigrant residents as well as those who had suffered substantial or total loss of their property or income. As OTM and UVFC expanded their roles and partnerships, a third hub was eventually opened at the Family Resource Center at Phillips Elementary School to help meet the increased demand.

The generosity of over 50,000 donors contributing more than $140 million to the recovery efforts allowed local community-based organizations to respond to the immediate needs of fire victims.

While many donors requested that 100% of their donation be given directly to those suffering as a result of the wildfires, it quickly became apparent that sufficient administrative support must also be made available to nonprofit organizations to ensure an effective service delivery strategy.

There is no doubt that the initial outpouring of support provided critical assistance to residents in crisis in the immediate aftermath of the fires. However, external donations to the region have slowed significantly since the public’s attention turned elsewhere, despite considerable ongoing unmet needs. In retrospect, a solid plan for managing the initial outpouring of financial support would have recognized and prepared for the expected decline in donations over time and budgeted additional resources for planning and sustaining intermediate and long-term recovery phases.

Throughout this time, OTM and UVFC continued distributing emergency financial assistance to residents who had experienced significant economic hardship. The partners’ programming was urgently designed to meet community needs, with ongoing direct support and bilingual, co-located services provided at these offices, including mental health supports, referrals to local employment services, and enrollment in disaster-specific public benefits. Through case management, OTM and UVFC facilitated access for victims to housing support, transportation, and child care needs.

The scale of the initial damage, combined with the secondary economic impacts to the region of the decline in tourism, resulted in many residents suffering from substantial and/or total loss requiring prolonged support to help them rebuild and fully recover. At this point OTM, UVFC and the other lead organizations began shifting

**LESSON**

While local non-profits and community-based organizations serve a critical role in providing follow up services to disaster victims, the administrative costs associated with effective disaster response are significant and legitimate. Organizations should be allowed to access resources to offset these expenses.

“We are stronger than we ever imagined. Of course, we have bad days, sometimes unable to get out of bed because of the depression or the dread of another day of to-do lists, however the majority of the time, and certainly more recently, we are positive, optimistic, and closer than before.”

**LESSON**

Thoughtful and proactive planning for the investment of donations should account for all phases of response and recovery so that long-term challenges are addressed as effectively as immediate needs.

Regional philanthropic organizations should work together to develop best practices and standing plans and protocols that ensure coordinated, multi-phased investment of resources donated in the wake of a disaster.
their focus toward supporting those residents who would be facing longer-term hardship, including financial insecurity, unemployment, and homelessness. In January 2018, OTM and UVFC began hiring additional staff and worked with NVCF and Adobe Services to open two Napa Fire Recovery Centers—one operated by OTM and the other by UPVC—to centralize long-term disaster recovery efforts and enable the family resource centers that were serving as temporary service hubs to return to their previous work.

OTM, UPVC, and other local organizations initiated a six-month plan to transition from responding to immediate needs to providing disaster case management. Part of this process involved the development of a Long Term Recovery Group (LTRG), a temporary organizational structure designed to establish a cohesive system of transitioning those who had suffered from substantial or total loss to long-term federal assistance from FEMA. The LTRG defined the populations in need of long-term assistance and developed a recovery framework.

In retrospect, when OTM, UVFC and other agencies were initially scrambling to attend to the community’s immediate needs, they had little capacity to plan for addressing the longer-term needs of the most heavily impacted residents. Adding to the challenge, all of the Long Term Recovery and COAD meetings were centered in the City of Napa, which required UVFC case managers and directors to travel long distances. Furthermore, at the onset of the fires, OTM and UVFC never suspected they would need to continue to play such a direct and leading role in the recovery many months later. Yet as the months passed and no clear alternative emerged, the organizations felt compelled to stay engaged. Unfortunately, because the partners had not envisioned playing this long-term role, they continually had to readjust and adapt to new processes and protocols with each phase of the recovery. Had they had the knowledge and foresight to form the LTRG immediately after the fires broke out, long-term recovery could have been incorporated into the recovery framework much more effectively.

Today the Fire Recovery Centers offer bilingual and bicultural disaster case management and a co-located resource center. Staff help residents who have suffered major property and/or income losses develop a disaster recovery plan, and navigate and access resources and services available for longer-term recovery. It is expected to take up to several years for the most impacted residents to fully recover and be restored to their pre-fire status.

One year later, the work goes on.

**LESSON**

It can be hard to envision and plan for long-term needs while consumed with meeting the immediate needs of residents. Yet major disasters will inevitably result in the need for some organizations to provide long-term supports and services to victims. Thus, planning for long-term recovery should be integrated from the very beginning of the emergency response.
Conclusion

The October 2017 wildfires in and around Napa County were a catastrophic event, inflicting devastating human and economic costs on the region, traumatizing the local population, and severely straining agencies and organizations who rallied to respond and support impacted residents. While the response and recovery led by public agencies and community-based organizations in Napa County have not been without flaws—and unmet needs persist—the process benefited greatly from the thoughtful and collaborative retrospective analysis and future planning conducted in the wake of the region’s previous disaster. Lessons must be learned from these experiences to inform and improve local community disaster preparedness around the country.

We hope this report imparts some of the key lessons we have learned from this trying experience so that others may plan accordingly to minimize and mitigate the impacts on future victims.

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<th>FIRE RECOVERY BY THE NUMBERS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UPVALLEY RESIDENTS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>530 families were connected to recovery resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>100% of families were moderate to low-income</td>
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<td>84% of families were renters</td>
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<tr>
<td>16% owned their homes</td>
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<tr>
<td>59% were paying more than 30% of their income towards their housing costs</td>
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<td>43 families lost their homes</td>
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<td>38% owned their homes and were underinsured or not insured at all</td>
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<tr>
<td>52% were renters with no insurance</td>
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<td>90% didn’t have enough insurance to cover their losses</td>
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<td>$848,492 direct cash aid to UpValley residents</td>
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<td>72% of cash aid went towards housing</td>
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<td>15% received long-term case management support to help them connect to resources</td>
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Data reported for October 2017–August 2018
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